I like the idea of a central hub to download new missions from.
I've noticed a similar trend with programming languages, where having a central repository for libraries and associated dependency management tools can really help quickly increase the usability and popularity of a language.
Of course, we don't currently have a whole lot of content to distribute. In that regards, this might not be the most impactful use of time. On the other hand, not being able to easily distribute content can create an extra barrier that may discourage creating new content.
Excluding missions with binary DLLs seems like a real hindrance. For such a system to be really useful, I think we need some way to allow binary distribution for DLLs.
One way we might approach security, is to somehow sign each version of the DLLs, so people can know who wrote it, and who declared it to be safe. That sort of matches how things are informally done now. Custom missions have started being packaged into the game download. For missions to be included in the game download, people responsible for packaging the download have to accept them, which generally implies a certain degree of review. We don't currently have a very formal vetting system, though mostly missions that are included are from long time members who have been around for years, and have accumulated a certain amount of trust. Source code helps with that.
If a new member wishes to distribute something, and they are unknown, they could potentially ask a long time member to review it, and sign off on a review. Before a level is downloaded, the user can be presented with summary information, such as who the author is, how long they've been a member at OPU (if at all), and who signed off on review (along with how long they've been a member). We could also present a link to the source code.
For review purposes, we might require the mission have source code posted on GitHub. That may increase the effectiveness of review. It may also increase the safety, as the binaries could then be built on independent Continuous Integration servers, based on the source code that was checked in to GitHub. That way the binary matches up with the source code provided for review. We could even manage this through GitHub releases, where the Continuous Integration servers publish the binary as a new release on GitHub. That could effectively be our central store for distribution purposes.
Anyway, that's a rough idea I have for how things could potentially be managed. It still needs details on how the list of missions is collated, how binaries are signed, and signing them without disturbing a release by trying to add new files to it (which could affect signing), how to revoke signing should a problem be discovered after the fact, and how users might be warned of newly announced problems.
Another part of that is Continuous Integration builds can also scan the code for potential problems, using linters, compiler warnings, or virus scanning of the result, and potentially auto signing for basic safety.